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JAMES COLGROVE
Reform and Its Discontents:
Public Health in New York City 
During the Great Society
The health-care system was one of the most visible and contentious bat-
tlegrounds on which the social conflicts of the 1960s unfolded. To an
unprecedented extent, health status—especially the stark disadvantage in
access and outcomes for racial and ethnic minorities and the poor—
became an object of public and governmental concern during the Great
Society era, as clinicians, community activists, politicians, and policy-
makers sought to create new models of medical care that were more equi-
table and efficient than those of the past. The social science theories that
informed the ambitious programs of Lyndon Johnson’s administration
gave an imprimatur to the idea that illness was both cause and conse-
quence of the “cycle of poverty.”1
The ferment of this period raised fundamental questions about the
place of public health in American society. For most of the twentieth cen-
tury, the public health profession, concerned with prevention rather than
cure and population-level analysis rather than patient care, was institu-
tionally weak compared with organized medicine, and it struggled to
advance a community-focused mission in a civic culture that privileged
individualism, the free market, and limited government. In the latter half
of the 1960s, grassroots mobilization, coupled with federal and state com-
mitments to health care for the poor, opened a window of opportunity in
which public health professionals could argue that their field, by virtue of
its unique perspective and experience, had a special role to play in health
reform. But the social and political conditions that created this opening
also served as countervailing forces that limited what was possible in the
new environment.
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Nowhere was this landscape more unsettled than in New York City,
which had a long tradition of innovative public health activities. In the
mid-1960s, the city became, in the words of an economist who advised
Mayor John Lindsay’s administration, “one of the country’s chief labora-
tories” for testing a “commitment to the use of the public authority to
accomplish social change.”2 As part of an effort, now largely forgotten, to
rationalize the city’s massive and unwieldy health bureaucracy, the
Department of Health was consolidated into an omnibus agency that
linked it closely with the city’s powerful medical and hospital establish-
ment. Department employees sought to use new funding streams and a
more open social climate to advance an expansive vision of public health,
and forged new relationships with doctors and community members, the
two constituencies that had historically bounded their mission. But their
efforts at reform were caught between political and economic pressures
from “above” and radical resistance from “below.”
The social policy innovations of the War on Poverty and the Great
Society have been the subject of extensive historical analysis.3 But this
literature has given little systematic attention to the health-care arena and
virtually no consideration to the role of public health.4 The debates over
the appropriate sphere of public health provide a unique vantage from
which to gain a fuller understanding of key transformations in American
society in the 1960s: the shifting relationship between citizens and gov-
ernment; the expansion of legislative efforts to address the problems of
the poor and disadvantaged; the development of a discourse of “rights,”
including the right to health; and the erosion of paternalistic notions of
expertise, especially medical authority. This brief but pivotal chapter also
sheds new light on challenges that still define the health-care system, as
policymakers continue to debate the place of prevention within the coun-
try’s technocratic and curatively oriented medical regime.
The Divergence of Public Health and Medicine
The professional and conceptual borders between public health and medi-
cine were erected early in the twentieth century as clinicians in private or
hospital practice diverged from sanitary reformers and laboratory-oriented
bacteriologists in the public and voluntary sectors. As Allan Brandt and
Martha Gardner have argued, the American health-care system was thus
shaped by “the division of labor, the differences in theories and skills, and
the balance of authority and politics between these two fundamentally
related fields.”5 Physicians, represented by their increasingly powerful lobby,
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the American Medical Association, claimed authority over the domain of
patient care and vehemently opposed moves by municipal and state health
departments to provide clinical services.6 As preventive practices such as
routine physicals became common in the 1920s, public health officials
clashed with doctors in private practice over who would deliver these serv-
ices. These tensions crystallized in the debates over the publicly funded
maternal and child health programs of the federal Sheppard-Towner Act,
which Congress passed in 1921 and AMA lobbying killed eight years later.7
In the decades that followed, public health became a kind of residual cate-
gory: anything related to the population’s physical well-being that remained
outside the purview of organized medicine. Its practitioners collected sta-
tistics to map and control the spread of illness, published health-education
materials, and performed a grab-bag of licensing and regulatory functions in
areas such as restaurant sanitation. Their direct-care responsibilities were
limited to poor charity patients who could not afford the services of a pri-
vate physician, and treatment for tuberculosis and venereal diseases, stig-
matized conditions for which they had historically been responsible.8 The
profession’s heterogeneous workforce of doctors, nurses, epidemiologists,
and educators claimed a more enlightened, sociologically informed view of
health than the narrow focus of biomedicine, but their lack of political
influence constrained their ability to shape the health-care environment.9
In the 1930s and 1940s, argues Elizabeth Fee, debates continued
within the American Public Health Association “between ‘progressives’
who wanted public health and medical care services to be provided in a
single, unified system and ‘conservatives’ who wanted to leave well enough
alone: to confine public health to its traditional preventive activities and
categorical programs, while leaving medical care to the clinicians.”10 In the
postwar years, the growth in the biomedical research enterprise, exempli-
fied by the dramatic rise in federal funding for the National Institutes of
Health, reinforced the paradigm that illness was to be fought at the physi-
ological rather than the societal level, and further eclipsed the perspective
offered by the public health profession. The delivery of medical care
remained firmly entrenched in a fee-for-service model, especially after the
ignominious defeat of Harry Truman’s proposal for national health insur-
ance at the hands of the AMA. The association’s strategy of hanging the
label of “socialism” on any proposal for publicly funded health care suc-
cessfully defused such initiatives through the 1950s.11
The emergence of poverty as a focus of the Kennedy administration
set the stage for a reexamination of the status quo that had prevailed for
decades. New legislative and policy initiatives addressed a set of related
empirical and philosophical questions: How do poverty and its attendant
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social conditions influence health? How should medical care be linked not
just with prevention but with housing, education, employment, and other
aspects of welfare broadly conceived? What is the role of the state in pro-
viding some or all of these services? When Lyndon Johnson declared the
War on Poverty in 1964, new health-related programs, premised on socio-
logical and economic theories, poured money and expertise into commu-
nities around the country.12 During Johnson’s administration, Congress
passed approximately fifty pieces of legislation related to health, providing
funds that flowed through units of the federal government including the
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the Children’s Bureau, and the
U.S. Public Health Service. Annual federal spending on health grew from
about $3 billion in 1959–60 to about $21 billion in 1970–71.13
The neighborhood health centers, funded by the OEO, were in many
respects emblematic of the era. The centers were innovative demonstra-
tion projects designed to provide integrated medical screening, diagnosis,
and treatment closely linked with ancillary services such as job training
that would improve the life prospects of those attending. The centers’
guiding principles included strong involvement of community members as
advisors and lay workers; by explicitly seeking to foster the political
empowerment of patients, they were intended to serve not merely as sites
for care but as engines of social change.14 In 1965 and 1966 the first round
of eight centers opened, followed by another thirty in 1967 and 1968.15
The neighborhood health centers did not emerge from the federal
public health establishment, though they embodied the philosophy of
many of the field’s liberals. Jack Geiger and Count Gibson, the Tufts
University physicians who were architects of the neighborhood health center
model, originally asked the Public Health Service to serve as a home for
the program, but the agency, long reluctant to antagonize the medical
lobby, referred the two men to the Office of Economic Opportunity.16 It
was unclear, moreover, whether the new federal interest and funding
would strengthen the institutional position of public health, at least in its
traditional bastion of state and local health departments. The OEO made
most grants for neighborhood health centers to medical schools and hos-
pitals, on the grounds that they were best positioned in terms of facilities,
equipment, and clinical expertise to get up and running quickly. As a
result, some public health officials saw the centers as undermining their
status as the group best qualified to care for the poor.17 In addition, the
availability of health-related funding to nonprofit community-based organ-
izations and other lay providers threatened to further splinter the field of
public health, and dilute its already limited political influence, by adding
to the diversity of the people addressing the connections among health,
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poverty, and social conditions.18 Much was in flux in the new environ-
ment, and it was far from certain what role public health professionals
would play in the reforms that seemed to be taking shape.
A Window of Opportunity and a Model for 
Reform in New York City
The New York City Department of Health seemed ideally positioned at
the start of the Johnson administration to capitalize on the new policy
environment. The department, a leader in the field since its founding as
the country’s first permanent municipal health authority in 1866, had
established pioneering programs in health education, public health nursing,
well-child care, and infectious disease control, and operated a network of
twenty-seven health centers throughout the five boroughs that gave it a
high profile in the community. But these centers reflected a long-standing
accommodation with the city’s private practitioners: they provided pre-
vention and screening, but their clinical services were narrowly confined
to the traditional categories of tuberculosis and venereal disease. Any
other medical problem uncovered at a municipal health center was
referred elsewhere—to a private doctor or hospital outpatient depart-
ment—for follow-up and treatment.
When the neighborhood health center program emerged from the
OEO, its principles resonated strongly with a cadre of health department
employees dissatisfied with the sharp institutional boundaries between
public health and medicine and the high concentration of preventable ill-
ness in the city’s poor neighborhoods compared to its wealthy areas.19
These employees were not radicals but career public servants for whom the
new civil rights discourse of justice dovetailed with ideas about compre-
hensive care that they had formed after years on the front lines working
with low-income populations. Theirs was a moderate, incremental vision of
liberal reform, borne of the realism that came from working in the city’s
civil service. They sought mainly to broaden their traditional preventive
activities to include ambulatory care, and secondarily to involve community
members in the planning of services. But they did not see these changes as
the gateway to radical social change or patients’ political empowerment.
The department’s most forceful advocate for expanding its provision
of ambulatory care was Mary McLaughlin, an assistant commissioner.
McLaughlin was a physician who had risen through the department ranks
during two decades of service in poor neighborhoods. Her commitment
and that of her like-minded colleagues grew in part from frustration at
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having to refer patients elsewhere for care, knowing that follow-through
was unlikely because of costs and the fragmentation of the health-care
system. In the fall of 1965 McLaughlin and her cohorts first requested
funds from the City Council to expand the services of the district health
centers beyond what they had traditionally offered to include a full range
of outpatient care. The services would be provided by contracting with
nearby hospitals, which would provide the clinicians and equipment. The
first two sites chosen for the expansion would be in two of the city’s most
economically depressed neighborhoods, Bedford and Brownsville.
The budget request that the department submitted to the City
Council reflected the ideals and language of the Great Society. It argued
that “health and medical care programming must become very closely
involved with social and welfare activities, public assistance programs and
public housing, these in recognition that socio-economic factors are
major determinants of health status.”20 The request also reflected the
influence of the nascent consumer movement, which advanced the idea
that health care was a commodity with which its purchasers had a right
to be satisfied: “Health prevention and promotion on the one hand and
diagnostic and curative services on the other,” the document declared,
“must be brought together into a more comprehensive non-fragmented,
easily available package for the consuming public.”21
Finally, in explaining its proposed partnership with hospitals to pro-
vide clinical services, the department contended that there was “an awak-
ening and growing awareness by hospitals that their programs cannot
remain parochial and unresponsive to the total health needs of their sur-
rounding communities, and that they must be equal partners with the
Health Department in the shaping of comprehensive health services for
local communities.”22 There was little evidence of such an “awakening,”
and the assertion of one was rhetorical and strategic—designed to convince
the City Council that the partnerships would bear fruit—rather than fac-
tual. The city’s public and private hospitals (especially those in poor neigh-
borhoods) had shown scant interest in the needs of their surrounding
communities, and while they had cooperated in various health depart-
ment initiatives, such as an ambulance transport service for premature
newborns, they hardly viewed the health department as an “equal partner”
in their work. To the extent that they were aware of the department at all,
most hospital administrators viewed it as a civil service backwater far
removed from the important business of patient care.
Even as this initial foray into ambulatory care was being made, the
health department was facing an uncertain future. In 1965 the departure
of George James, the popular commissioner, left a leadership void just as
JAMES COLGROVE 9
a major reconfiguration of the city’s health bureaucracy was taking shape.
As new debates unfolded about the professional spheres of public health
and medicine, the existence of the department as a separate entity in city
government was called into question. These developments in local poli-
tics were independent of the new federal health programs, but they would
powerfully shape—and ultimately constrain—the incipient reform efforts
that the department was undertaking.
John Lindsay and the Health Services Administration
On December 31, 1965, John Lindsay was sworn in as New York City’s
103rd mayor. A charismatic liberal Republican and rising star on the
national political scene, Lindsay promised to reform what he character-
ized as twelve years of corruption and complacency under Robert 
F. Wagner Jr. and the city’s Democratic machine. He brought with him a
team of “good government” planners armed with the latest ideas in
municipal reform.23 Health had not been a major issue during the cam-
paign and was not high on the list of the new administration’s initial pri-
orities—relations with powerful labor unions took center stage when a
strike by transit workers crippled the city on Lindsay’s first day in office—
but long-simmering problems, combined with new federal initiatives,
soon pushed it to the top of the policy agenda.
When Lindsay took office, a profound sociodemographic shift was
remaking the city, and the delivery of health services was becoming insep-
arable from issues of race, class, and poverty. Between 1950 and 1970 the
city’s white population declined by about 1.3 million, while its population
of African Americans and Puerto Ricans increased by about the same
number.24 Many of these new arrivals were concentrated in slum neigh-
borhoods, and their de facto primary-care providers were the understaffed
and overcrowded emergency rooms and outpatient departments of the
city’s hospitals. Emergency-room visits to city hospitals doubled between
1960 and 1966.25 Close to a third of the city’s population, about 2.5
million people, were medically indigent.26
The magnitude of the city’s health needs was matched by the size
and complexity of its health-care sector, which accounted for about 15
percent of the city’s $4 billion annual budget. Almost one in five of the
city’s 42,500 employees worked in either the department of health or the
department of hospitals. The latter agency, established in 1929, ran nine-
teen hospitals and medical centers with some 18,500 beds. The city’s
department of welfare also ran seven clinics especially for welfare
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recipients.27 Inefficiency, duplication of effort, and gaps in care were
widespread. Both the health and the hospitals department operated
bureaus of tuberculosis control, for example, which rarely communicated
with each other. The department of welfare operated dental clinics for its
clients only, while the health department ran dental clinics for children
only, and the department of hospitals performed tooth extractions only.28
As part of their efforts to revitalize and streamline the city’s civil
service bureaucracy, Lindsay’s team swiftly moved to consolidate some
fifty municipal departments and agencies into ten “superagencies” that
would unite related functions of government such as finance, housing, and
transportation.29 One of these was to be a new entity called the Health
Services Administration (HSA), which would join the departments of
health and hospitals under the same administrative umbrella. (The new
organization would also include two other health-related agencies, the
Community Mental Health Board and the Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner. The Department of Welfare was made part of a different super-
agency, the Human Resources Administration.) While government reform
was the chief impulse for the creation of the new agency, the proposed con-
solidation was consistent with one of the ideals that underlay the OEO’s
neighborhood health centers: that preventive and curative health services
should be linked in a more continuous and patient-friendly system of care.
It was unclear, however, whether the organizational structure of the
HSA would be a barrier or facilitator for the incipient movement within
the health department to create new models of care. On the one hand,
administratively uniting curative and preventive services seemed a logical
and necessary step toward bringing about systemic change. The commis-
sioners of all four of the affected agencies urged the City Council to pass
enabling legislation, arguing that new federal grant programs made it
essential for the components of the city’s health-care system to become
unified so that they would be well positioned to apply for funds that
became available.30 Mary McLaughlin, who championed the health
department’s involvement in clinical services, put the matter bluntly in a
letter to the City Council: “The waste, duplication and inefficiencies of
the past must come to an end.”31
On the other hand, many public health leaders feared the dilution
of what made their enterprise unique. Alonzo Yerby, a leading national
figure in preventive medicine who had led the city’s Department of
Hospitals before taking a professorship at Harvard University, described
this anxiety in an address at the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and
Public Health in the fall of 1966: “Public health people fear that their
preventive programs will be lost in the daily crises of providing hospital
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care for large numbers of patients. Administrators of public hospitals feel
too hard-pressed by obsolete facilities, personnel shortages, strikes and
work stoppages, and ever-mounting demands for services to consider the
special needs of a program of prevention.”32 Said Cecil Sheps, a promi-
nent hospital administrator and adviser to Lindsay, “When there’s blood
to stop flowing, and bones to mend, public health can get lost.”33
Some of the uncertainty about whether the new HSA structure
would impede or enhance reform involved the question of whether all
organizational borders would be dissolved or whether the individual
departments would be retained with a new layer of bureaucracy overlaid
on top to coordinate their diverse functions. Members of the Board of
Health, a five-member body made up of some of the city’s medical and
political elite, insisted in a letter to Lindsay that public health had to
retain its independent status if the reform efforts were to succeed.34
Lindsay promised the board members that reorganization legislation
would specifically provide for a separate health department.35
Nevertheless, many health department employees remained anxious
about their influence and their future. Their unease reflected in part the
precarious position in which the department had only recently found
itself. The department had enjoyed a heyday under the eight-year com-
missionership of Leona Baumgartner (1954–62), who had assumed near-
legendary status for her political savvy and tireless promotion of the
department and its interests. When her widely respected successor,
George James, resigned in 1965 to become dean of the Mt. Sinai School
of Medicine, the department was suddenly without a strong leader to
advance its interests as the merger took shape.
At the same time, pay stagnation created by a Lindsay administration
salary freeze made it difficult to attract top-flight talent to the depart-
ment’s middle and upper ranks. The starting annual pay for an assistant
commissioner in the Department of Health, a position that required a
medical degree, was $25,000, compared to $27,500 for a master’s level
nonphysician administrator in the Department of Hospitals.36 Many top
managers left the health department following James’s departure, while
shortages of public health nurses—the department’s “foot soldiers”
against disease—left health centers understaffed and forced the cancella-
tion of some programs, such as immunization clinics for low-income chil-
dren. Working conditions in the district health centers, many of them
deteriorating facilities that had not been renovated in decades, were dif-
ficult. “Years ago,” wrote one health official, “the dynamic programming
of the department with opportunity to do public health research as well
as the desire of physicians to live in ‘fun city’ was sufficient to attract and
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keep staff. This is no longer true. Many now desire to leave the City where
the problems sometimes seem insoluble and City living is no longer
attractive.”37
The extent of anxiety about the future was revealed by the unusual
step taken by a group of health department physicians in the summer of
1966. Alarmed by the absence of a leader to serve as their advocate, they
enlisted the assistance of former commissioner Leona Baumgartner, who
remained an influential figure on the local health scene. “We feel that
[creation of the Health Services Administration] will lead inevitably to a
complete takeover of our department’s functions by voluntary hospitals
whose experience, goals and capabilities do not encompass the public
health field at all,” the doctors warned. “The end result of subordinating
the Health Department’s functions to those of hospitals will, we believe,
result in a sharp curtailment or elimination of important preventive pro-
grams, a complete breakdown of department morale, and a resultant seri-
ous threat to the public health.”38
The First Health Services Administrator
To fill the post of the city’s first Health Services Administrator, who
would be charged with fostering close relationships among departments
that had operated with distinctly different missions and professional cul-
tures, Lindsay’s search committee turned to Howard J. Brown. An expe-
rienced program planner and manager as well as a physician, Brown had
gained a strong reputation locally and nationally by designing an innova-
tive outpatient clinic serving low-income residents of the city’s Lower East
Side that provided one of the models for the neighborhood health center
program. He then went on to serve as the OEO’s chief medical adviser,
and helped establish similar facilities in rural Mississippi, in Watts,
California, and in several other cities around the country.39
The choice of Brown thus provided a direct conceptual and practi-
cal link between New York City’s health-care system and the reform ini-
tiatives emerging at the federal level. Brown’s ideals were also consonant
with those of the health department’s progressives, who had taken steps
to expand their ambulatory services, and his appointment augured well
for these efforts. As Brown explained to Louis Craco, the young lawyer
who chaired the Mayor’s Task Force on Reorganization of the
Government, shortly after accepting his new post: “There is a general
consensus among modern public health and medical care professionals
that the clinical, preventive and mental health services now fragmented
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should be united into coherent programs.”40 Preparing a statement that
Lindsay would read in testimony before the U.S. Congress on health chal-
lenges facing the country’s large urban areas, Brown identified the two
most pressing problems as rebuilding deteriorating hospitals and financ-
ing and organizing medical care for “ghetto” areas.41
Not only was Brown committed to retaining an independent
Department of Health within the HSA; he foresaw that it would be
primus inter pares among the units that made up the combined organiza-
tion. Describing his long-range vision of the mission of the department
to colleagues at Johns Hopkins, Brown wrote, “The major planning, coor-
dination, surveillance and evaluation responsibility of the total health
programs in New York City” would rest with public health professionals,
while the other units would have “more specialized functions, major as
they will be, as compared to this broad charge of the Health
Department.”42 The Department of Hospitals, he believed, would be
limited to “bricks and mortar considerations.” The health department’s
charge would not be “to do all that is necessary to protect and promote
the city’s health, but to make sure it is done” through standard-setting,
surveillance, research, and demonstrations. Finally, he laid out a vision
for the public health workforce that suggested a return to the social
medicine roots of public health in the nineteenth century, when the field
was guided by reformers such as Rudolph Virchow and Lemuel Shattuck.
The public health leaders of the future, Brown predicted, would be
“board certified public health physicians with training and skills in com-
munity medicine—medical sociologists, health urbanists—whatever they
might be called . . . with one foot in the technical field of the science of
medicine and the other in community dynamics.”43
Brown’s vision failed to thrive within the new bureaucracy, however.
Almost immediately, differing institutional cultures and priorities and
conflicting personalities resulted in turf battles involving authority over fis-
cal and programmatic matters among the four constituent agencies that
had publicly supported the merger.44 Brown found himself at odds with
members of the medical establishment because of their unwillingness to
embrace his view of health services organization. His increasingly blunt
public criticisms of his fellow physicians—in one speech he contended that
they organized care based on “their own need for professional distinction”
rather than concern for patients—cost him critical support among what
should have been a core constituency.45 After seventeen turbulent months
on the job, Brown abruptly resigned in December 1967.46 Neither of his
successors would last more than two years in the position. The lack of a
consistent, forceful advocate at the helm of the Health Services
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Administration would prove to be a critical weakness that hampered the
health department’s ability to take the lead in reform.
“Ghetto Medicine”: The Health Department as 
Care Provider and Watchdog
In spite of Brown’s departure and the uncertain environment, health
department employees committed to expanding the department’s clinical
services pressed ahead with their plans, fashioning a proposal for capital
renovations of health centers that had previously provided only preven-
tive services.47 Because of the stigma that clung to free clinics for the poor,
the new facilities would be named neighborhood family-care centers.
“The term ‘clinic’ is scrupulously avoided in speaking of this program,”
Mary McLaughlin explained in a subsequent report. Each center would
“operate on an appointment basis and we hope to pattern it on the type
of care given in a private physician’s office or a good group practice unit.
The usual clinic appearance of benches, crowding, and lack of regard for
patients’ comfort, is a thing of the past.”48 After Lindsay’s budget director
and the City Council gave the go-ahead to the budget request to partially
cover the substantial capital costs, plans for neighborhood family-care
centers took shape. Seven would be in entirely new facilities and nine
would be in renovations of existing sites in poverty areas.
That these forays by the health department into ambulatory care did
not provoke the kind of resistance from the city’s medical establishment
that had been seen in the past is a testament to their incremental nature
and the fact that they were limited to care for the poor, which was a tra-
ditional part of public health’s purview. The lack of opposition also
bespoke the degree of crisis in which the city’s hospitals found themselves
in the latter half of the 1960s. They had long been plagued by chronic
staff shortages, deteriorating physical plants, and accusations of substan-
dard care.49 A mayoral task force appointed when Lindsay took office
found rampant administrative inefficiency, wide disparities in the quality
and quantity of preventive and curative services given to people of differing
socioeconomic backgrounds, an unwillingness to adapt services to the
needs of a racially and ethnically diverse patient population, and lack of
outpatient-care facilities.50 The modest effort by the health department 
to expand its ambulatory services in poor communities was, at that
moment, the least of the hospitals’ concerns.
Some resistance to the new neighborhood centers did come, how-
ever, from within the health department’s own rank and file. The clinical
JAMES COLGROVE 15
staff of the health centers that were slated for expansion included many
physicians with a more traditional orientation toward the appropriate
spheres of public health and medicine. Because the new neighborhood
family-care centers were to be operated in partnership with an affiliated
hospital, many health department doctors feared that they would be sub-
ordinated in their work to better-trained hospital-based practitioners, or,
worse, that they might be moved onto to the hospital payroll, thereby
losing the seniority they had gained within the city’s civil service system.51
A more serious threat to reform than resistance from within was the
instability of funding. Reimbursements from Medicaid, the landmark
federal-state program established in 1965 to finance care for the medically
indigent, were expected to cover a major portion of the costs of the new
clinical services.52 But New York’s Medicaid program had been in disar-
ray virtually from its inception in 1966 due to unexpectedly high costs
that had blindsided even knowledgeable insiders. Bureaucratic confusion
reigned amid infighting over administrative matters such as patient eligi-
bility and physician reimbursement.53 In this precarious environment it
was impossible to predict what level of funding would be available even a
short time in the future; McLaughlin described the program’s financing
as “quicksand.”54 Indeed, in 1968 the parlous state of Medicaid set off a
chain reaction that would reverberate throughout the state’s health-care
system, most powerfully in New York City. A pivotal point in the contro-
versy was the state aid program known as “ghetto medicine.”
The state department of health originated the ghetto medicine pro-
gram in response to concerns about the shortage of medical care available
to the poor in rural and urban slum areas. Two bills introduced in the
New York legislature in the summer of 1968 amended the state public
health law to allow local health departments to provide clinical services
and to receive reimbursement from the state for fifty percent of their
costs, the same proportion they received for their traditional categorical
programs related to tuberculosis and venereal disease. The bills slipped
under the radar of the large health-care interests and passed the legisla-
ture late in the session without debate.55 McLaughlin submitted several
applications for ghetto medicine funding to support the new neighbor-
hood family-care centers, three of which were funded.
Within a year, however, the ghetto medicine program was unexpect-
edly transformed by the crisis of spiraling costs that had gripped New
York’s Medicaid program. By 1968, New York City accounted for fully
one-quarter of the nation’s total Medicaid enrollment and one-fifth of the
total national expenditure on the program. Some 2.5 million residents—
more than 30 percent of the city’s population—had enrolled.56 In response
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to the upwardly spiraling costs, the state legislature made drastic cutbacks
in eligibility, resulting in close to 1.8 million adults and children being
thrown off of the rolls. (“As a result of the confusion and despair regard-
ing eligibility for medical benefits,” cautioned a health department report
in the summer of 1968, “we may one day very soon witness the first
demonstrations for the right to health care in the United States.”)57
Although some of these individuals were subsequently re-enrolled, the
overall rolls dropped by close to one million recipients, including almost
three hundred thousand children.58
Faced with a fiscal crisis because of the sudden loss of revenue they
had anticipated from Medicaid, many of New York City’s private hospi-
tals were forced to take out loans at high interest. The city’s powerful
hospital lobby enjoyed close access to Governor Nelson Rockefeller, and
in the midst of the crisis sent representatives to meet with him to say
they faced ruinous losses that could force the closure of some of their
outpatient services.59 State legislators agreed to use state aid through the
ghetto medicine program to keep these hospitals’ ambulatory-care servi-
ces from going bankrupt. Thus money that had originally been intended
to allow health departments to create new outpatient services for the
poor was instead diverted to propping up existing services in private
hospitals.
Liberal health advocacy and civic organizations were dismayed. They
dubbed the plan “Operation Bailout” and claimed that private institutions
with abysmal track records in caring for the poor should not be receiving
public funds.60 But faced with a more skilled and better-connected lobby,
public health had been outflanked. A highly critical analysis by a member
of the Citizens Committee for Children charged that public health “did
not wish to take on the voluntary hospital establishment or else did not
know how to do it. . . . Public health leadership was invisible, seemingly
unable or unwilling to compete in the political arena.”61
The diversion of money to the voluntary hospitals did come with
strings, however, which McLaughlin and another assistant commissioner,
Lowell Bellin, were successfully able to manipulate. In order for the hos-
pitals to be eligible for state aid, they had to become “public” institutions.
Their ambulatory-care services were therefore “municipalized” and placed
under the aegis of the city heath department.62 McLaughlin and Bellin
quickly realized that the arrangement provided them with a wedge they
could use to improve the services in institutions whose practices had long
remained outside their managerial purview. As Bellin explained in a sub-
sequent report, the ghetto medicine program allowed the department to
use its “newly acquired fiscal leverage to accelerate socially desirable
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policies and administrative changes in voluntary hospitals historically
insulated from health department dissatisfactions and restiveness.”63
Among the changes in policy and practice that the department included
in the contracts they negotiated with each institution were the hiring of a
director specifically responsible for outpatient care, the provision of inter-
preters for patients, development of lists of available services, and the
convening of regular public hearings on matters of hospital policy.
Bellin’s pursuit of oversight in private hospitals was consistent with a
broader mission he had undertaken in 1967 to set standards and audit the
quality of care provided by doctors participating in Medicaid. This watch-
dog role was made possible by a combination of legal and administrative
authority: language in the Federal Title XIX (Medicaid) legislation, New
York State’s Medicaid law, and an administrative agreement between the
city and state health department.64 Bellin was aggressive and unapologetic
in his vision of the health department’s role in monitoring the provision
of medical services. He drew an analogy to the department’s other, well-
accepted regulatory functions. “[The health department] furnishes a
restaurant a license, which confers privileges,” he explained. “It can always
withdraw the license together with the privileges for due cause, that is, a
cause in the interest of the public health. The analogy is obvious. The
provision of foodstuffs to the public bears a potential hazard to the public
health and therefore falls within the official purview of the local health
department. Similarly, the provision of personal health services to the
public bears potential hazard to the public health and therefore should fall
within the official purview of the local health department.”65
Unsurprisingly, Bellin experienced considerable pushback from
local physicians. Typical was the complaint of the president of Queens
Medical Society, who insisted that “quality medical care can no more be
legislated than any Congress or Assembly or Senate can legislate honesty
or integrity or tolerance.”66 A local medical society passed a resolution
declaring itself “unalterably opposed to any system of self-imposed certi-
fication of a physician’s competency by any governmental agency” and to
“any governmental agency evaluating the quality of medical care.”67
In spite of limited funding and personnel for enforcement, the
health department’s auditing and standard-setting program was one of its
most successful reform efforts, sustained in large measure by the sheer
force of Bellin’s dogged personality. In 1969 rulings were handed down
in three lawsuits challenging the department’s authority to regulate tax-
supported private medical care, and in each case the department’s posi-
tion was upheld. One concerned the reimbursement rate for chiropractic
services; one challenged the authority to hold a hearing on allegedly
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fraudulent Medicaid dental services; a third affirmed the authority to
suspend or eliminate podiatrists from Medicaid eligibility because of sub-
standard care.68
The Perils of Community Involvement
As the health department confronted obstacles from “above”—lack of
leadership in the Health Services Administration, the inadequacy of fed-
eral and state funding, and political maneuvering by the medical and hos-
pital establishment—along with reluctance from within its own ranks, its
reform efforts were simultaneously complicated by resistance from
“below.” Energized by the example of civil rights mobilization and chal-
lenges to long-standing power hierarchies, community groups contended,
sometimes militantly, that they, not doctors, hospital managers, or health
department bureaucrats, should have final say over how the city planned
and delivered its health care. Although the department had actively
sought to incorporate community input in the form of advisory boards
for the new neighborhood family-care centers, the involvement of these
groups added a new layer of dynamics with which the health department
often found itself inadequately prepared to deal.
The input of “consumers” into the planning and implementation
of services was a cornerstone of the Great Society’s health programs. It
was codified in federal legislation such as the Community Mental
Health Centers Act of 1963, which mandated the creation of commu-
nity advisory boards. This involvement was subsequently strengthened
by the Office of Economic Opportunity’s requirement for “maximum
feasible participation” of poor communities in the neighborhood health
centers.69 In 1966, the Partnership for Health Act further institutionalized
community-planning processes.70
Since the nineteenth century, New York City had had a well-developed
voluntary sector of service organizations and civic groups concerned with
health issues. Typical was the Citizens Committee for Children, which had
been founded by a group of liberal social activists and philanthropists in
1946, and had a long track record of reform efforts, such as attempting to
improve the conditions for African American youth in the city’s notoriously
segregated child welfare system.71 In the 1960s, a new breed of community
activist emerged. Unlike established organizations that grew out of a tradi-
tion of white protestant charity work by upper-class reformers, these new
groups were more confrontational and less inclined to accomplish their
goals by cultivating relationships with key decision-makers or engaging in
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time-consuming negotiation through official channels. Many groups were
made up of the intended beneficiaries of services. As one observer sum-
marized in 1969: “Frustration, confrontation, and overt conflict are more
and more becoming the modes of problem-centered action by those inter-
ested enough to get involved. In the past, service projects were not cooper-
ative ventures; they were imposed—albeit in a charitable way—from the one
side, and the clients were at least expected to be happy with what they got.
Today that is impossible. The new identity and increased self-esteem of the
‘other America’ has rejected the supplicant’s role and demands more than
charity.”72
As the health department’s neighborhood family-care centers took
shape, citizens’ groups subjected them to close scrutiny and, often, harsh
criticism. In 1968, for example, the Citizens Committee for Children, the
Lower East Side Neighborhood Association, and the Northeast
Neighborhood Association wrote to Lindsay about “numerous complaints
from community groups.” The organizations claimed that the health
department had failed to involve community members in the planning of
services for centers that were being proposed for Harlem and Jamaica,
Queens, and cited specifically the department’s failure to clarify the stan-
dards for the services that would be offered in the new facilities and to
provide ongoing information about their future plans.73 The Citywide
Health and Mental Health Council, another advocacy group, complained
in a letter to Lindsay and the City Council that the Health Services
Administration had displayed “a colossal disregard for community con-
cern, dissent, and recommendation” and that the new organization had
perpetuated “more of the same evils it was supposed to correct.”74
The responsibility in the health department for day-to-day interac-
tions with community groups typically fell to district health officers,
physicians who earned relatively low salaries and were overburdened with
other duties. Most were also white, older, and very different in socioeco-
nomic background from the communities with whom they interacted.
The complicated process of diplomacy and delicate negotiations, often
racially charged, required a skill set very different from what they had
developed in their professional training and experience.75
Pressure from liberal advocacy groups, including HealthPAC and the
Citizens’ Committee for Children, had led to a provision in the ghetto
medicine legislation requiring that, in return for receiving state aid, each
beneficiary hospital create an advisory board made up of fifty-one percent
of its members from the community.76 But the degree of authority these
bodies would have over hospitals’ decision-making, and indeed the precise
nature of their mission, was ambiguous. According to the official guidelines
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promulgated by the city, the groups “should neither be interpreted as hav-
ing ‘community control’ nor as performing a perfunctory role. The com-
mittee should be viewed as a mechanism to facilitate both delivery and
community utilization of ambulatory services.”77 The health department
was to work closely with the advisory groups, serving as a kind of mediator
between their interests and perspectives and those of the hospitals. But
these alliances were not uncomplicated. The committees varied widely in
their knowledge of the health-care sector and their skill at dealing with the
byzantine operations of hospitals. Mutual mistrust and even hostility char-
acterized the relationships between some of the committees and the hospi-
tals they advised; one committee filed suit against both the hospital and the
health commissioner, claiming that they deliberately withheld needed
information.78
Even as the health department’s new involvement with medical care
brought it into conflict with community groups, it also met resistance in
its traditional domain of population-level prevention. Amid increasingly
assertive grassroots activism, the department’s efforts to address illnesses
related to poor living conditions encountered a minefield of potential
criticism. The challenges of dealing with a health problem that was both
deeply entrenched in poverty and subject of militant community action
crystallized around the issue of lead poisoning. In 1967, the city recorded
642 cases of lead poisoning—mostly among African American and Puerto
Rican children—and four deaths.79 Political pressure on the Lindsay
administration to address the issue began to mount as an increasing num-
ber of citizens’ groups began accusing the city of “genocide” of its poor
children living in slum housing.80 In response, the department under-
took a pilot program evaluating the use of an experimental urine test that
could be used in door-to-door screening to determine the extent of the
problem and identify children in need of treatment. In 1969, a group of
young student radicals and Puerto Rican nationalists, the Young Lords,
mounted a public challenge to this effort.81
The Young Lords, in the tradition of militant activist groups such as
the Black Panthers, sought to fight economic and political injustice and
bring about radical social change. A New York chapter of the group,
formed in 1969 after splintering from the founding organization in
Chicago, first made a mark by collecting garbage from the sidewalks of
East Harlem and piling it in the middle of the streets, forcing the depart-
ment of sanitation to remove it so that traffic could flow. The garbage
dumpings escalated over the summer of 1969 into demonstrations in
which the Lords barricaded neighborhood streets and clashed with
police. Soon after their formation, the group adopted the health of the
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residents of el barrio as a primary focus of their activism.82 In the fall the
group issued a “10-point health program” that included demands for
“total self-determination of all health services in East Harlem” and “free
publicly supported health care for treatment and prevention.” The plan
clearly revealed the extent to which poor health was viewed as insepara-
ble from other forms of social injustice: one of the ten points demanded
“education programs for all the people to expose health problems—sani-
tation, rats, poor housing, malnutrition, police brutality, pollution, and
other forms of oppression.” The plan also took direct aim at the city’s
existing health-care bureaucracy: point 2 demanded “immediate replace-
ment of all Lindsay and [Hospitals commissioner Joseph] Terenzio
administrators by community and staff-appointed people whose practice
has demonstrated their commitment to serve our poor community.”83
On the morning of November 24, 1969, about thirty people, mostly
members of Young Lords and their supporters, arrived at health depart-
ment headquarters. They entered the office of Mary McLaughlin—whom
Lindsay had recently appointed health commissioner—demanding a
meeting about the issue of lead paint. McLaughlin and the assistant com-
missioner in charge of lead poisoning were at an all-day conference across
town, but the group insisted they would not leave the premises until their
demands were met. They wanted the department to turn over some forty
thousand urine test kits that were being used in the pilot screening
program; convinced that the failure to deploy the kits more widely was
rooted in indifference to the problems of poor ethnic minorities, the
group sought to take matters into their own hands and do the outreach
themselves. McLaughlin’s secretary was able to reach one of her deputies,
David Harris, who rushed to McLaughlin’s office to meet with the group.
With the demonstrators sitting on the floor or perched on tabletops,
Harris explained that the test kits were of uncertain validity and were still
being evaluated. A deal was ultimately reached to allow the Young Lords
to use a limited number of kits in collaboration with health department
doctors who had expertise in lead screening.84
The confrontation in the commissioner’s office epitomized the clash-
ing perspectives of health professionals and activists. Where Harris saw the
need to proceed carefully according to scientific evidence so as not to
waste scarce resources on measures that might be ineffective or counter-
productive, aggrieved community members saw bureaucratic stonewalling.
(The urine test, it was later confirmed, was not a valid predictor of lead
poisoning and was thus unsuitable for use in a screening program.)85
In the aftermath of the occupation, the liberal weekly newspaper the
Village Voice, which had given supportive coverage to the Young Lords’
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previous efforts, took up the cause of lead poisoning among ghetto children.
Muckraking Voice columnist Jack Newfield, a crusader for liberal political
causes, repeatedly pilloried Lindsay and the health department for their
inaction. He charged that mayoral aid Werner Kamarsky and McLaughlin
were “cut off from the dailiness of injustice by their positions and life
styles”86 and bluntly accused McLaughlin of lying to the mayor and the press
about the extent of the lead paint problem and the department’s response.87
The following summer, the city was rocked by repeated unrest in the
city’s poor African American and Puerto Rican neighborhoods. In June,
angry residents of Brownsville burned garbage in the streets in protest of
poor municipal services.88 The same week, after one of the Young Lords’
leaders was arrested, hundreds of youths rioted in East Harlem, smashing
store windows and burning garbage. Three days after the riot, the Young
Lords mounted another assault on health department judgment around
another issue that disproportionately affected the poor: tuberculosis. On
June 17, a group of Young Lords “liberated” a mobile tuberculosis
screeing van parked at 116th Street and Lexington Avenue in East
Harlem. After driving the van five blocks south and one block west, they
parked it across the street from the group’s headquarters, draped a Puerto
Rican flag over it, and rechristened it the Ramón Emeterio Betances
Health Truck, in honor of the nineteenth-century Puerto Rican doctor
and antislavery revolutionary. The X-ray technicians inside continued to
perform their duties as crowds milled around outside, television crews
parked at the scene, and a heavy police presence gathered, including offi-
cers stationed on the roofs of adjoining buildings.89 After several hours
of tense negotiations involving the Lords, the health officer in charge of
East Harlem, and department officials downtown, an agreement was
reached stipulating that the truck would be free to travel “anywhere in the
metropolitan area as deemed necessary by the Young Lords party for the
best health care for our poor and oppressed people.”90
Epilogue: The Limits of Reform
During the Great Society era, moderate liberals within the New York City
health department were able to advance a variety of reforms within the
progressive political and social climate that prevailed nationally. They
added ambulatory care to their traditional preventive activities, involved
community members in the planning and implementation of services,
audited the quality of care provided by physicians receiving reimburse-
ment from public funds, and mounted new efforts to address health
JAMES COLGROVE 23
problems such as lead poisoning that were rooted in socioeconomic
injustice. At the same time, however, forces “below” and “above” con-
strained what they could accomplish. Community members newly
empowered as partners in health department efforts often proved unco-
operative and even hostile, while financing from federal and state legisla-
tion remained unstable. The crisis of New York State’s unforeseen and
exorbitant Medicaid expenses, it was clear in retrospect, doomed the
funding for the health department’s efforts. The subsequent diversion of
state money from the department to private hospitals “took the heart out
of the ‘Ghetto Medicine’ program,” a subsequent analysis argued, “before
it could be started.”91 Just three neighborhood family-care centers were
created, far short of the sixteen originally envisioned.
Even more severe fiscal retrenchment would soon put a decisive end
to reform. The continued flight of the middle class to the suburbs during
the early 1970s and the consequent erosion of the tax base plunged New
York City into straits that culminated in its infamous collapse into insol-
vency in 1975. The city was taken over mid-year by a “municipal assis-
tance corporation” (dubbed “Big Mac” by local pundits), an independent
coalition of investors that kept the city solvent by assuming the most
immediate of its massive debts.92 The staff of the Department of Health
was cut by one-fourth. In a series of triage decisions, department services
were categorized as “life saving” versus “life enhancing,” with the latter
subject to cuts.93 In this environment, the kind of expansion that had
become possible in the mid-1960s was foreclosed.
At  national level, backlash against the “big government” solutions
of the Johnson administration had begun to set in before they had
scarcely gotten under way. Typical was the fate of the neighborhood
health center program. Funding for the centers remained flat during the
Nixon and Ford administrations, in spite of escalating health-care costs;
beginning in 1970, the program was gradually transferred from the OEO
to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, where it “stag-
nated,” according to an analysis in the late 1970s.94 As consequential as
the lack of financial commitment was the disappearance of the political
will to expand health and welfare services for the poor.
Even in New York City, with its tradition of liberalism and generous
social provision, the public health profession’s advocates for reform were
hobbled by their institutional position: most were either political
appointees or civil servants subject to pressure from powerful interests
and lacking a natural base of constituents to support their work. As a
result, their vision of change was realistic and incremental rather than
radical. To some of the field’s liberal members, this realism, placed
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against the promise of the Great Society’s ambitious ideals, simply
provided a cover for political timidity and ineptitude. This view was given
voice most eloquently by Paul Cornely, a Howard University professor of
preventive medicine. Newly elected in 1969 as the first African American
to head the American Public Health Association, he gave an address at
the group’s annual meeting in Philadelphia in which he sharply chided
his colleagues for their failure to advocate more aggressively for reform.
Cornely declared that the association had been “a mere bystander” on
urgent social issues such as occupational health and environmental pro-
tection, and had failed to put forth any concrete proposal for a national
health plan during the preceding decade when the possibility of so much
change had been on the table. Public health professionals, he charged
bluntly, remained “outside the power structure.”95 But as the experience
of New York City reveals, the prospects for public health professionals to
grasp the levers of power were always limited, even at one of the most
progressive moments of the twentieth century.
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